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1.- Introduction 
 
Ecological economics is a recently developed field, which sees the economy as 
a subsystem of a larger finite global ecosystem. Ecological economists question 
the sustainability of the economy because of its environmental impacts and its 
material and energy requirements, and also because of the growth of 
population. Attempts at assigning money values to environmental services and 
losses, and attempts at correcting macroeconomic accounting,  are part of 
ecological economics, but its main thrust is rather in developing physical 
indicators and indexes of sustainability. Ecological economists also work on the 
relations between property rights and resource management, they model the 
interactions between the economy and the environment, they study ecological 
distribution conflicts, they use management tools such as integrated 
environmental assessment and multi-criteria decision aids, and they propose 
new instruments of environmental policy.  
 
2.- Origins 
 
The book that came out of the first world conference of ecological economists in 
Washington D.C. in 1990 (Costanza ed, 1991) defined the field as "the science 
and management of sustainability". In the late 19th c. and early 20th c. the 
biologist and urban planner Patrick Geddes, the "narodnik" revolutionary and 
physician Sergei Podolinski, the engineer and social reformer Josef Popper-
Lynkeus had unsuccessfully tried to promote a biophysical view of the 
economy, as a subsystem embedded in a larger system subject to the laws of 
thermodynamics (Martinez-Alier and Schlupmann, 1987). By 1850 or 1860 the 
carbon cycle and the cycles of plant nutrients had been discovered, while the 
first and second laws of thermodynamics (conservation and transformation of 
energy, but also dissipation of energy and increase in entropy) had been 
established. The contrived conflict between the "optimistic" theory of evolution 
which explained the diversity of life, and the "pessimistic" second law of 
thermodynamics, was a staple of the cultural diet of the early 1900s. Therefore, 
the main ingredients for an ecological view of the economy were present much 
before the birth of a self-conscious ecological economics, delayed by the strict 
boundaries between the natural and the social sciences. 
 
The biologist and systems ecologist Alfred Lotka, born in 1880,introduced in the 
1910s and early 1920s the fundamental distinction between the endosomatic 
use and the exosomatic use of energy by humans. The Nobel prize in chemistry 
Frederick Soddy, born in 1877, wrote also on energy and the economy. He 
compared "real wealth" which grows at the rhythms of nature and which, if 
turned into manufactured capital, is worn down, with "virtual wealth" in the form 
of debts which apparently could grow exponentially for ever. Later, four well- 
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known economists, who did not yet form a school, are seen in retrospect as 
ecological economists: Kenneth Boulding, born in 1910, who worked mainly on 
general systems analysis, K. W. Kapp, born also in 1910, and S. von Ciriacy-
Wantrup, born in 1906, who were both institutionalist economists, Nicholas 
Georgescu-Roegen, born in 1906, who was the author of The Entropy Law and 
the Economic Process (1971). The systems ecologist H. T. Odum, born in 1924, 
studied the use of energy in the economy: some of his former students were 
among the founders of the International Society for Ecological Economics in 
1987. Other sources of ecological economics are in Environmental and 
Resource Economics (i.e. microeconomics applied to environmental pollution 
and  the depletion of natural resources),  in Human Ecology, Ecological 
Anthropology, Agroecology and Urban Ecology, and also in the study of 
"industrial metabolism" as developed by Robert Ayres,  now known as Industrial 
Ecology. 
 
After an influential meeting in Sweden in 1982 on the integration of economics 
and ecology organised by the ecologist AnnMari Jansson, the International 
Society for Ecological Economics (ISEE) was launched at a workshop in 
Barcelona in 1987, precisely on the same year as the Brundtland Report on 
"sustainable development" was published. Herman Daly (a former student of 
Georgescu-Roegen, and today's best known ecological economist) proposed 
that the word "development" should mean changes in the economic and social 
structure, while "growth" means an increase in the scale of the economy which 
probably cannot be ecologically sustained. "Sustainable development" is thus 
acceptable to most ecological economists, while "sustainable growth" is not 
(Daly, 1994). The first issue of the successful academic journal Ecological 
Economics came out in 1989, edited since then by the ecologist Robert 
Costanza, who was also the first president of ISEE. The ISEE has affiliated 
societies in Argentina and Uruguay, Australia and New Zealand, Brazil, 
Canada, the European Union, India, Russia, the United States. 
  
Outside the United States and Europe, the Japanese "entropy school" of 
economic analysis (Tamanoi, Tsuchida, Murota, 1984) studied the 
environmental services provided by the water cycle, and also the ancient urban 
ecosystems of Japan. In India, there was much work since the 1970s by 
economists but also by biologists (Madhav Gadgil) on the links between forest 
or water management and common property rights, nowadays one main focus 
of interest in ecological economics (Berkes and Folke, eds., 1998).  Other early 
ecological economists (whose major works were not in English) are, in France, 
Rene Passet (1979, 1996), and Ignacy Sachs who proposed in the early 1970s 
the notion of "eco-development"; Roefie Hueting (1980) in the Netherlands and 
Christian Leipert (1989) in Germany; Jose-Manuel Naredo in Spain. (For 
general introductions to the field: Costanza et al eds, 1997; Costanza et al 
1997; Common, 1995). 
 
3. Scope 
 
Ecological economists see the economy as an open system. In 
thermodynamics, systems are classified as "open" to the entry and exit of 
energy and materials, "closed" to the entry and exit of materials though open to 
5/2001-UHE/UAB-16/05/2001 
the entry and exit of energy, such as the Earth, and "isolated" systems (without 
entry or exit of energy and materials). The availability of free energy and the 
cycling of materials allows life forms to become ever more organised and 
complex, the same applies to the economy. Dissipated energy and waste are 
produced in the process. At least part of the waste can be recycled or, when 
not, the economy takes in new resources. However, if the scale of the economy 
is too large and its speed is too rapid, then the natural cycles cannot produce 
the resources or absorb or assimilate the residues such as, for instance, heavy 
metals or carbon dioxide. In ecological economics the economy is see as 
embedded in the ecosystem (or, more accurately, in the historically changing 
social perception of the ecosystem). The economy is also embedded in a 
structure of property rights on environmental resources and services, in a social 
distribution of power and income, in social structures of gender, social class or 
caste. 
 
Instead, in conventional economics the economy is seen as a self-sufficient 
system where prices for consumer goods and services, and prices for the 
services of production factors, are formed. This  pre-analytic stand is reflected 
in the category of "externalities". Ecological economists (Norgaard, 1990) have 
disputed the view expressed in the 1960s by Barnett, Krutilla and many other 
resource economists, that since natural resources are cheap, they must be 
abundant. Markets are myopic, they discount the future, they cannot see future 
uncertain scarcities of sources or sinks. Ecological economists understand and 
even sympathize with attempts at "internalizing" externalities into the price 
system, they readily concur with proposals to correct prices by taxes (such as 
"natural capital depletion taxes" or taxes on pollution) but they deny that there 
exists a set of "ecologically correct prices".  
 
In summary, ecological economics is a new transdisciplinary field which 
develops or introduces topics and methods such as: 
   
-new indicators and indices of (un)sustainability of the economy; 
 
-the application of ecological notions of carrying capacity and resilience to 
human ecosystems; 
 
-the valuation of environmental services in money terms, but also the discussion 
on incommensurability of values, and the application of multi-criteria evaluation 
methods; 
 
-risk assessment, uncertainty, complexity and "post-normal" science;  
 
-integrated environmental assessment, including building of scenarios,  
dynamic modelling, participatory methods of decision making; 
 
-ecological macroeconomics, the measurement of "natural capital", the debate 
between "weak" and "strong" notions of sustainability; 
 
-relations between ecological and feminist economics; 
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-ecological distribution conflicts; 
 
-relations between the allocation of property rights and resource management, 
old and new communal institutions for environmental management; 
 
-international trade and the environment, the "ecological debt"; 
 
-environmental causes and consequences of technological change, relations 
between ecological economics and evolutionary economics; 
 
-theories of consumption (needs, satisfactors), as they relate to environmental 
impacts; 
 
-the "dematerialization" debate; relations with industrial ecology; 
 
-applications in business administration; 
 
-instruments of environmental policy, often centred on the "precautionary 
principle" (or on "safe minimum standards", as developed by Ciriacy-Wantrup). 
 
Only some of these points can be developed in the remaining space, doing 
some injustice by this choice to other work by ecological economists. 
 
4.- Disputes on value standards 
 
The Greek distinction (as in Aristotle's Politica) between "oikonomia" (the art of 
material provisioning of the household) and "chrematistics" (the study of the 
formation of market prices, in order to make money) seems irrelevant because 
material provisioning appears to be mostly achieved through market exchanges, 
and there is a fusion of chrematistics with oikonomia. However, many caring 
activities in families and in society, and many services of Nature (Waring, 1988), 
remain outside the market. In ecological economics the word "economics" is 
used in a sense closer to  "oikonomia" than to "chrematistics". Ecological 
economics is not committed to a unique type of value expressed in a single 
numeraire. "The issue is not whether it is only the market place that can 
determine value, for economists have long debated other means of valuation; 
our concern is with the assumption that in any dialogue, all valuations or 
"numeraires" should be reducible to a single one-dimension standard" 
(Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1994: 198). Ecological economics encompasses 
money-valuation, and also physical appraisals of the environmental impacts of 
the human economy measured in their own physical "numeraires". 
 
Nature provides resources for the production of commodities and it also 
provides environmental amenities. As shown by Gretchen Daily, R. de Groot 
and other authors, Nature, more importantly, gives gratis essential life-support 
services such as the cycling of nutrients, the water cycle, soil formation, climate 
regulation, conservation and evolution of biodiversity, concentration of minerals, 
dispersal or assimilation of pollutants, diverse forms of useful energy, etc. 
Attempts have been made to assign money values to the annual flows of some 
environmental services, to compare them to GNP in monetary units of account. 
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For instance, the cycling of nutrients (nitrogen, phosphorous) in some natural 
systems may be given a plausible money value by comparison with the costs of 
alternative human-made technologies. Could this same methodology (i.e. the 
cost of alternative technology) be applied consistently to the valuation of 
biodiversity in a kind of science fiction Jurassic Park framework? For 
biodiversity, money valuation has taken a completely different tack, namely 
the small sums exchanged in some "bioprospecting" contracts, or fictitious 
subjective money values in terms of "willingness to pay" for conservation 
projects, i.e. the so-called Contingent Valuation method favoured by 
environmental economists (though not by most ecological economists). How to 
count the service that Nature provides us by concentrating minerals which we 
disperse? ("Exergy" costs have been calculated by industrial ecologists, but the 
technology for creating mineral deposits does not exist). Therefore, the figures 
obtained for the money values of environmental services provided free by 
Nature are incongruous. They are useful, however, in stimulating the debate on 
how  "to take Nature into account". 
 
Ecological economics rests on a foundation of "weak comparability of values" 
(O'Neill, 1993). One example: let us assume that a new large garbage dump 
must be built near a city, and that there are three possible locations, A, B, C, 
one of which will be sacrificed. In our example, the three different locations are 
compared under three different types of value: value as habitat, value as 
landscape, and economic value. Location A is a most valuable publicly owned 
wetland (valuable as habitat or ecosystem because of its richness of species) 
but a monotonous landscape, much visited by bird-watchers and schools (and, 
as such, of some economic value according to the "travel cost method"). 
Location C produces much rent as industrial and urban land, and therefore 
ranks first in economic value, but ranks only third as an ecosystem or habitat, 
and comes second as landscape (because of its historical qualities). Location B 
is an old agricultural area of beautiful derelict orchards and ancient manor 
houses, which ranks first as landscape, but ranks only third as rent-producing, 
and second as ecosystem or habitat. Which location should be sacrificed? How 
to decide? Should and could all values be reduced to a super-value, so as to 
achieve strong comparability, and even strong commensurability (cardinal 
measurement)? In the example, the economic values  (in actual or fictitious 
markets) of all three locations have been taken into account, but there is no 
super-value (economic, or otherwise such as for instance net energy production 
by which the wetland would presumably come out on top). Certainly, the 
present rankings could be reconsidered. Thus, the landscape value of A could 
be upgraded, and its economic value (as also that of B) could be increased by 
Contingent Valuation. Also, giving more weight to some criteria than to others, 
or  "veto thresholds" for some criteria such as the "endangered species" 
provision in American legislation, or the introduction of more locations or more 
criteria, would help us to escape from the present deadlock. The point of the 
exercise is merely to show the meaning of "weak comparability of values". The 
decision-making process need not be irrational (by lottery, for instance). 
 
In contrast to such a multi-criteria approach (Munda, 1995), in cost-benefit 
analysis the projects to be evaluated are all valued in the same numeraire 
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(present value in money terms of costs and benefits, including of course 
monetarized externalities and environmental amenities).  
 
In microeconomics, there is strong comparability of values, and indeed strong 
commensurability, when externalities are internalized into the price system, as 
in the definition of a Pigovian tax as the economic value of the externality at 
optimum pollution level. In macroeconomics, El Serafy's practical proposals to 
"green" the GNP (in Costanza, 1991)  -the results of which will depend on the 
chosen rate of  interest- do not go beyond strong commensurability in money 
terms. According to El Serafy, not all receipts from the sale of exhaustible 
resources ("natural capital") should be included in GNP, only one part should be 
included, "true" income, and the rest should be counted as "decapitalization" or 
the "user cost" of such "natural capital" which should be invested at compound 
interest over the period until the resource is exhausted, so as to allow the 
country to live at the same standard of living even when running out of the 
resources. This proposal, based on the definition of "income" by Hicks, and 
related to Hotelling's rule in resource microeconomics, is based on a notion of 
"weak" sustainability only. "Weak" sustainability allows the substitution of 
manufactured capital for so-called "natural capital"  -implying therefore a 
common unit of measurement, i.e. money value- while "strong" sustainability 
refers to the maintenance of physical natural resources and services (David 
Pearce and Kerry Turner introduced this distinction c. 1990). 
 
The so-called "Environmental Kuznets Curve", an inverted U-curve, relates 
income and some environmental impacts (de Bruyn and Opschoor, 1997). In 
urban situations, as incomes grow sulphur dioxide emissions first increase and 
then decrease, while carbon dioxide emissions increase with incomes. If 
something improves and something deteriorates, one reaction from the 
conventional economist might be to put weights or to put prices on such effects, 
in the pursuit of commensurability of values. However, the uncertainty and 
complexity of such situations (sulphur dioxide may counteract the greenhouse 
effect, for instance), and the fact that the price of externalities would depend on 
the outcome of social conflicts, implies that the economist's accounts would be 
convincing only for the believers of the same school. 
 
When the pattern of use of environmental resources and services and the 
burdens of pollution are shown to depend on changing social structures and on 
power and income distribution, then we enter the field of political ecology which 
originates in geography and anthropology, and which we define as the study of 
"ecological distribution conflicts". Economic growth leads to increased 
environmental impacts, and to increased conflicts (often outside the market 
sphere). Hence, for instance, the growth of the Environmental Justice 
movement in the United States. Examples abound of the failure of the price 
system to indicate such environmental impacts, or (to use K. W. Kapp's idea), 
examples abound of cost-shifting successes. Thus, attempts at using cost-
benefit analysis of the increased greenhouse effect (as in reports of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) are not convincing because of the 
arbitrariness of the discount rate  (Azar and Sterner, 1996, see below), and also 
because many items are not easily measured in physical terms, much less 
easily valued in money terms. Moreover, the very pattern of prices in the 
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economy would be different to start with, without the free access to carbon sinks 
- or should restrictions be imposed on the "ecological footprint" of rich 
economies or on the "human appropriation of net primary production" (see 
below). Should equal property rights on carbon sinks be bestowed on 
everybody, there might still be a tendency for the price of carbon emissions to 
be low, according to the principle "the poor sell cheap". Everybody is owner, 
except slaves, of her or his own body and health, however poor people sell their 
health cheaply when working for a wage in mines or plantations. Free use of 
sinks has been modelled in a neo-Ricardian framework by Ch. Perrings, Martin 
O'Connor and other authors, showing how the pattern of prices in the economy 
would be different assuming different outcomes for ecological distribution 
conflicts.  
   
Some remarks are still needed on the discount rate. Economists explain 
discounting of the future by subjective "time-preference", or because economic 
growth per capita caused by today's investments,  will make the marginal utility 
of consumption lower for our descendants than it is for us today. Accepting this 
second argument, namely, discounting arises from the productivity of capital,  
and taking into account that such "productivity" is a mixture of true increases in 
production and a lot of environmental destruction,  then the discount factor 
should be the per capita rate of sustainable economic growth, subtracting 
therefore the destruction of environmental resources and services. Now, in 
order to determine the present-economic-value of such destruction caused by 
economic growth (loss of biodiversity, filling up of carbon sinks, production of 
radioactive waste...), we need not only to put money-figures on it (as discussed 
above), we need also a discount rate. Which? 
 
5.- Environmental indexes of (un)sustainability 
 
Because of the shortcomings of money valuation, ecological economists favour 
physical indicators and indexes in order to judge the overall impact of the 
human economy on the environment. Therefore, we leave here aside monetary 
corrections to GNP, such as El Serafy's (see above), or Hueting's, which 
calculates the economic costs of adjusting the economy to socially negotiated 
norms or standards of pollution and resource extraction, in a "cost-
effectiveness" approach (by "cost-effectiveness" is meant the analysis of the 
cheapest instrument in money terms in order to adjust the economy to such 
physical norms or standards). We also leave aside Cobb's and Daly's ambitious 
Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW) (Daly and Cobb, 1989, 1994), 
first calculated for the United States, which has inspired work in many countries, 
and whose end-result is a figure in money terms strongly commensurable with 
GNP though often showing quite a different trend. 
 
The main physical indexes of (un)sustainability discussed at present are as 
follows: 
 
-HANPP (human appropriation of net primary production) as proposed by 
Vitousek et al. (1986). The NPP is the amount of energy that the primary 
producers, the plants, make available to the rest of living species, the 
heterotrophs. Of this NPP, humankind "coopts" around 40 per cent in terrestrial 
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ecosystems. It is assumed that, the higher the HANPP, the less biomass is 
available for "wild" biodiversity. The proportion of NPP appropriated by humans 
is increasing because of population growth, and also because of increasing 
demands on land per person for urbanization, for growing feedstuffs, for 
growing timber ("plantations are not forests" is a slogan of environmental 
activists in the Tropics). 
 
-Ecospace and Ecological Footprint. Which is the environmental load of the 
economy,  in terms of space? H.T. Odum had posed the question, and later 
authors (Opschoor,  Rees) developed some answers. Rather than asking what 
maximum population a particular region or country can support sustainably, the 
question becomes: how large an area of productive land is needed (as source 
and sink) in order to sustain a given population indefinitely, at its current 
standard of living and with current technologies? Computations, not only for 
cities or metropolitan regions (whose "ecological footprint" is hundreds of times 
larger than their own territories) but for whole countries, show that some 
densely populated European countries (assuming per capita eco-footprints of 3 
ha) or Japan or Korea (with per capita eco-footprints of 2 ha) occupy eco-
spaces ten times larger than their own territories. This is "appropriated carrying  
capacity", from which an "ecological debt" arises.  (For details, Wackernagel 
and Rees, 1995). 
 
-EROI, which stands for "energy return on (energy) input", also originates in 
H.T. Odum's work. Is there a trend towards an increasing energy-cost of 
obtaining energy? (Hall, Cleveland, Kaufman, 1986). The idea of looking at the 
basic economics of human society as a flow of energy is well known to 
ecological anthropologists (through Roy Rappaport's Pigs for the Ancestors and 
similar work). It goes back to Podolinski in 1880. Engels in 1882 exchanged 
correspondence with Marx on this topic, he denied the relevance of energy 
accounting for Marxian economics. Clearly, for an economy to be sustainable, 
the energy productivity of human work (i.e. how much energy is made available 
per day, by one day of human work) must be higher (or equal, is everybody is 
working) than the efficiency of the transformation of the energy intake into 
human work. The energy productivity of a coal miner (wrote Podolinski) was 
much larger than that a primitive agriculturalist could obtain, but this energy 
surplus from fossil fuels was transitory. Max Weber in 1909 had criticised 
Wilhelm Ostwald's interpretation of economic history in terms of a) an increased 
use of energy, b) an increased efficiency in the use of energy, because 
economic decisions on new industrial processes or new products were based 
on prices, entrepreneurs did not pay attention to energy accounts per se. (No 
environmental auditing of firms was still required). Max Weber (whose book 
review against Ostwald was much praised by Hayek in later years), did not yet 
question energy prices from the environmental point of view as we would today. 
In the early 1970s there were a number of studies on energy flow in agriculture, 
of which the best known were those of David Pimentel showing a decrease in 
energy efficiency in maize cultivation in the United Sate, because of the large 
energy input from outside agriculture itself. A new field was opened up by such 
studies (historic and cross-section) on the efficiency in the use of energy in 
different sectors of the economy, including the energy sector itself  (fuelwood, 
oil, gas, etc.) (Peet, 1992), taking also into account that increased energy 
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efficiency might paradoxically lead to increased energy use, by reducing its cost 
(the Jevons effect). Such energy analysis has nothing to do, in principle, with 
the adoption of an "energy theory of value", or with the view that sources of 
energy are more problematic for sustainability than sinks for residues. 
 
-MIPS and DMR/TMR. The indicator called MIPS (material input per unit 
service) was developed at the Wuppertal Institute (by Schmidt-Bleek). It adds 
up the materials used for production directly and indirectly (the "ecological 
rucksack"), such as mineral ores, the energy carriers (coal, oil), all biomass 
(though not water, which is used in much larger amounts), including the whole 
"life-cycle" down to the disposal or recycling phases. This material input is 
measured in tons, and it is compared with the services provided, sector by 
sector and, in principle, for the whole economy. For instance, in order to provide 
the service of one passenger-one km, or in order to provide the service of  living 
space of so many square metres, which is the amount of materials involved, 
comparing different regions of the world, or historically? MIPS is useful as a 
measure of the material intensity of production but not as a measure of toxicity 
of materials. The MIPS notion has been developed further in the statistics 
published by the World Resources Institute in 1997, on the Direct Material 
Requirement and the Total Material Requirement (i.e. the aggregate tonnage, 
including in the TMR the "ecological rucksacks") coming into the economies of 
some countries (United States, Germany, Netherlands, Japan) both from 
domestic sources and from imports, therefore testing the hypothesis of 
"dematerialization" of production (Bunker, 1996, Cleveland and Ruth, 1998). 
 
All the  indexes mentioned here are measured in different units. How should a 
situation be judged in which, for instance, a synthetic indicator or index such as 
TMR improves while HANPP deteriorates, EROI decreases, and GNP grows? 
Commensurability would imply reducing such values to an encompassing 
super-value but this is not necessary in order to reach reasonable judgements 
by a sort of macroeconomic multicriteria evaluation or integrated assessment 
(Faucheux and O'Connor, 1998). 
 
6.- The "dematerialization" of consumption? 
 
In economic theories of production and consumption, compensation and 
substitution reign supreme. Not so in ecological economics, where diverse 
standards of value are deployed  "to take Nature into account" (O'Connor and 
Spash, eds., 1999). In the ecological economics theory of consumption, some 
goods are more important and cannot be substituted by other goods 
(economists call this a "lexicographic" order of preferences). Thus, no other 
good can substitute or compensate for  the minimum amount of endosomatic 
energy necessary for human life. This does not imply  a biological view of 
human needs, on the contrary,  the human species exhibits enormous intra-
specific socially-caused differences in the use of exosomatic energy. To call 
either the endosomatic consumption of 1500 or 2000 kcal or the exosomatic 
use of 100,000 or 200,000 kcal per person/day a "socially constructed need, or 
want" would leave aside the ecological explanations and/or implications of such 
use of energy, while to call the daily endosomatic consumption of 1500 or 2000 
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kcal a "revealed preference" would betray the conventional economist's 
metaphysical viewpoint.  
 
There is another approach which, as pointed out by John Gowdy, builds upon  
the "principle of irreducibility" of needs (proclaimed by Georgescu-Roegen in 
the previous edition of the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, article on 
"Utility"). According to Max-Neef (Ekins and Max-Neef, 1992) all humans have 
the same needs, described as "subsistence", "affection", "protection", 
"understanding", "participation", "leisure", "creation", "identity". "freedom"... and 
there is no generalised principle of substitution among them. Such needs can 
be satisfied by a variety of "satisfactors". Instead of taking the economic 
services as given, as in MIPS (passenger-km, square metres of living space), 
we may ask why is there so much travel, why so much building of houses with 
new materials instead of restoration of old ones... There is now research on the 
following question: Is there a trend to use "satisfactors" increasingly intensive in 
energy and materials in order to satisfy predominantly non-material needs? 
(Jackson and Marks, 1999). Expectations that an economy which has less 
industry will be less resource intensive, are perhaps premature. Input-output 
analysis of household lifestyles (by Faye Duchin and other authors) shows the 
high material and energy requirements of the consumption patterns of many of 
those employed in the "post-industrial" sector. 
 
7.- Carrying capacity and "neo-Malthusianism" 
 
Many ecological economists have emphasized the pressure of population on 
resources. Has humankind exceeded "carrying capacity"? This is defined in 
ecology as the maximum population of a given species, such as frogs in a lake, 
which can be supported sustainably in a given territory without spoiling its 
resource base. However, the large differences internal to the human species in 
the exosomatic use of energy and materials, mean that the first question is, 
maximum population at which level of consumption? Second, human 
technologies change at a quick pace. Already Boserup's thesis (1965) of 
endogenous technical change according to which pre-industrial agricultural 
systems had changed in response to increases in population density, turned the 
tables on the Malthusian argument. Third, the territories occupied by humans 
are not "given", other species are pushed into corners or into oblivion (as the 
index HANPP implies), and, internal to the human species, territoriality is 
politically constructed through state migration policies. Fourth, international 
trade (similar to horizontal transport in ecology, but which humans can regulate 
consciously) may imply "ecologically unequal exchange", though if one territory 
lacks a very necessary item which is abundantly present in another territory, 
then Liebig's law of the minimum would recommend exchange. Then, the joint 
carrying capacity of all territories would be larger than the sum of the carrying 
capacities of all autarchic territories. This links up with NGO proposals for Fair 
and Ecological Trade. 
 
Because of the shortcomings of "carrying capacity" as an index of 
(un)sustainability for humans, the formula I=P.A.T has been proposed by Paul 
Ehrlich, where I is environmental impact, P is population, A is affluence per 
capita, and T stands for the environmental effects of technology. Efforts are 
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being made to operationalize I=PAT. Population becomes then only one 
variable in order to explain environmental load. Charges of "neo-Malthusianism" 
are unfounded. True, population remains one important variable. True also, 
"neo-Malthusian" population policies have caused in recent years many forced 
sterilizations and large-scale female infanticide in some countries, and they 
threaten small surviving ethnic groups. However, one hundred year ago, 
another neo-Malthusian movement in Europe and America (as shown by 
Francis Ronsin and other authors) opposed Malthus' view that poverty was due 
to overpopulation rather than social inequality, and fought successfully for 
limiting births by exercising women's "reproductive rights" (to use today's 
language), appealing sometimes also to ecological arguments of pressure of 
population on resources. Human demography is self-conscious or reflective. 
Though it also follows Verhulst's curve, it is different from the ecology of a 
population of frogs in a lake. 
 
8.- Final remarks: on transdisciplinarity 
 
Ecological economics, based on methodological pluralism (Norgaard, 1989) 
must not follow the reductionist road, rather it should adopt Otto Neurath's 
image of the "orchestration of the sciences", acknowledging and trying to 
reconcile  the contradictions arising between the different disciplines which deal 
with issues of ecological sustainability. Thus, how could a history of the 
industrialized agricultural economy be written taking  into account the opposite 
viewpoints of conventional agricultural economics (technical progress, growth of 
productivity), and of agroecology (loss of biodiversity, decreased energy 
efficiency)? The image of the "orchestration of the sciences" fits well with the 
ideas of "co-evolution" and of  "emergent complexity" implying the study of the 
human dimensions of ecological change and therefore the study of human 
environmental perceptions. This means to introduce self-conscious human 
agency and reflective human interpretation in ecology. While "emergent 
complexity" looks more to the unexpected future, "co-evolution" looks toward 
history. 
 
Ecological economics as an "orchestration of the sciences" takes into account 
the contradictions between the disciplines, it also takes into account changing 
historical perceptions of the relations between humans and the environment, 
and it highlights the limits of the authoritative judgements of any particular 
expert in a particular discipline. This is not a technocratic or scientistic project. 
On the contrary.  As explained by Funtowicz, Ravetz and other students of 
environmental risks, in many current problems of importance and urgency, 
where values are in dispute and uncertainties (not reducible to probabilistic risk) 
are high, we observe that "certified" experts are often challenged by citizens 
from environmental groups - for instance,  "popular epidemiology" activists 
inside the Environmental Justice movement in the United States, or debates on 
nuclear energy or on the labeling of new biotechnological foods, or proud 
arguments based on the practical knowledge of indigenous and peasant 
populations. This is "post-normal science", leading toward participatory methods 
of conflict resolution and even toward "discursive democracy", notions which 
are dear to ecological economists. 
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